TY  - THES
T1  - Novel classes of side channels and covert channels
A1  - Dürmuth,Markus
Y1  - 2010/05/04
N2  - When assessing the security of security-critical systems, it is crucial to consider conceptually new attacks, as appropriate countermeasures can only be implemented against known threats. Consequently, in this thesis we explore new classes of attacks and evaluate countermeasures. Our contribution is three-fold. We identify two previously unknown side channel attacks, i.e., attacks that exploit unintended information leakage. First, we consider optical emanations, i.e., the unavoidable emanation of every monitor. We demonstrate how to exploit tiny reflections in stationary objects and the human eye, and even diffuse reflections in objects such as the user';s shirt. Second, we study acoustic emanations of dot-matrix printers and show that the printed text can be reconstructed from a recording of the sound emitted while printing. Furthermore, we demonstrate a conceptually new covert channel: whereas side channels leak information unintentionally, in a covert channel there is an explicit sender that cooperates with the receiver. We present a new covert channel in the peer-reviewing process in scientific publishing that reveals the reviewer';s identity to the author. We additionally expose several related problems in the design of the PostScript language.
KW  - Computersicherheit
KW  - Sicherheitskritisches System
KW  - Eindringerkennung
KW  - Seitenkanalattacke
KW  - Kryptoanalyse
CY  - Saarbrücken
PB  - Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek
AD  - Postfach 151141, 66041 Saarbrücken
UR  - http://scidok.sulb.uni-saarland.de/volltexte/2010/2951
ER  -